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1949.)
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criminal, a first degree felony, in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
David B. Dee, Judge, presiding.

Jurisdiction is conferred on this

Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) (h) and Utah Code Ann.
§77-35-26(b)(1)(1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a criminal
action may take an appeal to the Supreme Court from a final judgment
of conviction of a first degree felony.
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dismissed pursuant to Article IV of the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers, Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5 (1953 as amended) where the State
did not bring him to trial within 120 days?
2.

Did the trial court err in failing to arraign Mr.

Stilling and hold a preliminary hearing after Mr. Stilling returned
to the State of Utah?
3. Was Mr. Stilling's right to a speedy trial under Utah
Constitution and Statutes and United States Constitutions violated?
4.

Was Mr. Stilling's right to a fair trial violated by

the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the problems
inherent in eyewitness identification?
5.

Did the Court violate Mr. Stilling's constitutional

right against double jeopardy by separately sentencing him for
aggravated robbery and for being an habitual criminal?
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

v.

:

STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING,

:

Case No. 870094

:

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Steven Stilling was convicted by a jury of aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. Sec.
76-6-302; Sec. 76-2-202; and Sec. 76-3-203(1-4), (1953) and being an
habitual criminal, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. Sec. 76-8-1002 (1953).

The court sentenced Mr. Stilling to two

concurrent sentences of five years to life at the Utah State Prison.
FACTS
On March 10, 1984, Self's Foodland was robbed by a man
carrying what a store employee believed to be a gun.

The robber, a

white male, found the store manager in the back room of the store,
showed the manager what he believed to be a gun and asked the
manager to empty the safe and the checkstands (R. 839). The manager
followed the instructions, walked with the man to the front of the
store, emptied the safe, and then had the two women operating the
cash registers empty the registers of the cash (R. 839-844).
After leaving the store, the robber stopped in the
parking lot and informed a customer that one of the checkers wanted

to talk to him (R. 974). The three store employees and one witness
from the parking lot described the man in general terms as having
from light to dark hair and a medium build (R. 846).
On April 25, 1984, Mr. Stilling was arrested in Portland,
Oregon on fugitive warrants out of Weber County and on May 11, 1984,
Mr. Stilling's Oregon parole was revoked and he was committed to the
Oregon State Prison (R. 45). On April 24, Salt Lake County informed
the Oregon State Prison that it was filing four counts of Aggravated
Robbery against Mr. Stilling.

Sometime before July 23, 1984, Salt

Lake County filed a detainer against Mr. Stilling under the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers (hereinafter l.A.D.)(Utah Code
Ann. Sec. 77-19-5 (1953 as amended)) (R. 303). Weber County also
filed a detainer against Mr. Stilling (R. 45).
On June 27, 1984, pursuant to Article IV(a) of the
I.A.D., Weber County requested temporary custody of Mr. Stilling for
prosecution (R. 303). As a result, Mr. Stilling was transported to
the Weber County Jail on August 17, 1984 (R. 303). On July 12,
Oregon acknowledged Weber County's request for temporary custody and
sent Weber County the inmate status report required by the I.A.D.
On September 19, 1984, Salt Lake County filed arrest
warrants with Weber County Jail officials based on the same acts for
which it had filed the detainer in Oregon (R. 109).
Mr. Stilling was not transported from the Weber County
Jail to Salt Lake County until January 14, 1985, 149 days after Mr.
Stilling's arrival in Utah, and 118 days after the arrest warrants
were filed in Weber County (R. 93). In the interim, Salt Lake
County officials made no attempt to either continue Mr. Stilling's
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trial or bring him to Salt Lake County.

Brian Renard Allen, a South

Salt Lake police officer, testified that there had been "a lapse" in
his attention to Mr. Stilling's case.

(R. 1720).

Mr. Stilling had

his preliminary hearing on January 29, 1985 (R. 08) and his district
court arraignment on February 8, 1985 (R. 17), 174 days after
Mr .Stilling's arrival in Utah and 143 days after Salt Lake County
filed the arrest warrants with Weber County (R. 93).
Mr. Stilling's case was originally set for trial on March
4, 1985 (R. 20). On February 21, 1985, Mr. Stilling filed a motion
to dismiss asking the District Court to dismiss the Salt Lake County
charges on the grounds that the County had violated I.A.D.
procedures when it requested custody of him and failed to bring him
to trial within 120 days of that request (R. 47). He argued that
the case against him should be dismissed since Salt Lake County
failed to bring him to trial within the requisite 120 days.l

He

also argued that the I.A.D. entitled him to have Oregon officials
review the request.
The trial judge chose not to rule on the 120 day issue
but did find that Salt Lake County had violated Mr. Stilling's right
to review the transfer by Oregon's governor as required by Article
IV(a) of the I.A.D. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R.
260).

As part of his finding, the trial judge concluded that Salt

1 Article IV(c) provides: ff(c) In respect of any proceeding made
possible by this Article, trial shall be commenced within one
hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving
state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his
counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter
may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance."

- 3 -

Lake County had triggered the provisions of the I.A.D. by filing the
detainer against Mr. Stilling while he was incarcerated in Oregon
(R. 259-260).2
To satisfy the requirements of the I.A.D., the trial
judge dismissed the case and ordered that Mr. Stilling be
immediately returned to Oregon (R. 110). The judge reserved ruling
on the 120 day issue for when and if Mr. Stilling was returned to
Salt Lake County (R. 237).
Prior to May 17, 1985, Mr. Stilling was paroled from the
Oregon State Prison and returned to Utah to begin serving his
commitment on Weber County sentences in the Utah State Prison.

Upon

motion of the State, trial on the Salt Lake County cases was reset
for September 3, 1985 (R. 91). Mr. Stilling was not rearraigned in
circuit or district court nor was a preliminary hearing held.

The

matter was simply set for trial in district court as a continuation
of the proceedings held in this case prior to his return to Oregon.
On June 12, 1985, Mr. Stilling renewed his motion to
dismiss based on the undecided aspect of his earlier motion that
Salt Lake County had violated Article IV(c) of the I.A.D. by not
trying him on its cases within 120 days after the arrest warrants
were filed (R. 93). Mr. Stilling contended that because he was
available to Salt Lake County the entire time he was in Utah, as
evidenced by the County's success in transporting him to Salt Lake

2 "Utah Code Annotated Section 77-29-5 is binding on Salt Lake
County and by filing a detainer against the defendant the County has
triggered its provisions." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
R. 259-261.
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When Mr. Stilling was ultimately tried on the charges in
this case after his return to the Utah State Prison to serve his
sentence on the Weber County charges, the trial court continued the
proceedings where it had left off prior to Mr. Stilling's return to
Oregon.

In the event this Court determines that the matter should

not be dismissed due to a violation of Article IV of the I.A.D., Mr.
Stilling nevertheless should be granted a new trial, including
initial appearance and preliminary hearing in circuit court.
The delay in bringing Mr. Stilling to trial violated his
statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial as guaranteed
by the Utah and United States Constitutions.

The state experienced

a "lapse" in its prosecution of Mr. Stilling, causing an
unacceptable length of delay before trial for which there was no
explanation.

Mr. Stilling asserted his right to a speedy trial and

was prejudiced by such delay.
Mr. Stilling's right to a fair trial was violated by the
trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the inherent
weaknesses of eyewitness identification.

Mr. Stilling was convicted

solely on the basis of eyewitness identification about which there
existed serious reliability questions.

Failure to apply the

standard set forth in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)
violates Mr. Stilling's rights to due process and equal protection
under the Utah and United States Constitutions.
Mr. Stilling's constitutional rights against being put in
double jeopardy were violated by the trial court's imposition of
separate sentences for his aggravated robbery and habitual criminal
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i n which an untried indictment, information or
complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a
prisoner against whom, he had lodged a detainer and
who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party
state made available in accordance with Article V(a)
hereof upon presentation of a written request for
temporary custody or availability to the appropriate
authorities of the state in which the prisoner
incarcerated, provided that the court having
ji; irisdiction of such indictment, information
complaint shall have duly approved, recorded ar.o
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the appropriate authorities before the request be
honored, within which period the governor of the
sending state may disapprove the request for thp
temporary custody or availability, either \iv<~ r '
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/

Article IV (c) of the I.A.D. provides that trial shall be
commenced within 120 days of the arrival in the receiving state
where temporary custody is obtained pursuant to Article IV.

Article

IV (c) states:
"(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by
this article, trial shall be commenced within one
hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner
in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in
open court, the prisoner or his counsel being
present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter
may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance."
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5 (IV)(a)(c) (emphasis added).
Article V of the Act specifies the remedy for violation
of the 120 day provision:
In the event that an action on the indictment,
information or complaint on the basis of which the
detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial
within the period provided in Article III or Article
IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction
where the indictment, information or complaint has
been pending shall enter an order dismissing the
same with prejudice and any detainer based therein
shall cease to be of any force or effect.
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5(V)(c) (1953 as amended).
In the present case, Salt Lake County filed a detainer
against Mr. Stilling with the Oregon authorities prior to July 23,
1984 (R. 303). At that time, Mr. Stilling was in custody of Oregon
officials.

This detainer activated the I.A.D. in regard to the Salt

Lake County charges pursuant to Article iv (a). Weber County also
filed a detainer against Mr. Stilling, and on July 12, 1984, Weber
County requested temporary custody (R. 303).
Pursuant to the provisions of the I.A.D., after Weber
County made its request for temporary custody, Oregon was required
to "furnish to all other officers and appropriate courts in the
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In United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct. 1834,
56 L.Ed. 2d 329 (1978), the United States Supreme Court ruled that
the I.A.D. is not limited to those cases where the receiving state's
detainer is followed by a formal "request for temporary custody".
In ruling that custody obtained by way of a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosguendum, was covered by the I.A.D., the Court said "we view
Article IV(c) as requiring commencement of trial within 120 days
whenever the receiving State initiates the disposition of charges
underlying a detainer it has previously lodged against a state
prisoner."

436 U.S. 363, 98 S.Ct. 1849.
The Court's opinion in Mauro makes no requirement that

the disposition of charges be initiated with the sending state in
order to activate the I.A.D. As the Court said in Mauro "Any other
reading of this section would allow the Government to gain the
advantages of lodging a detainer against a prisoner without assuming
the responsibilities that the Agreement intended to arise from such
an action."

Id. at 364.

The purpose behind Article IV of the I.A.D. is to insure
speedy disposition of charges once a prisoner has been transferred
to the receiving state.

(See United States v. Mauro, supra at 336.)

It does not make sense to allow the receiving state unlimited time
in which to try a prisoner against whom it has lodged a detainer
simply because it obtained custody of the prisoner from another
county which was proceeding under the I.A.D.

This would allow the

receiving state to circumvent the protections of Article IV.
By filing a detainer in Oregon and thereafter filing
arrest warrants with Weber County based on the charges underlying
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It did not undo the already completed

violation of the Agreement.
The State's position, that because Mr. Stilling never
received his required hearing, he never came under the I.A.D. is
logically inconsistent.

With this line of reasoning, the state

seems to be claiming that by violating the requirements of the
I.A.D. often enough, they no longer have to play by the rules at all.
After Mr. Stilling returned to Utah, Salt Lake County
chose to start where it left off rather than informing him of the
charges at an arraignment in circuit court, holding a preliminary
hearing, and thereafter arraigning him in district court. By
starting midstream, the trial court further acknowledged that the
I.A.D. was activated when the warrants were initially filed with
Weber County.

Although Salt Lake County may have physically

obtained Mr. Stilling from the Utah State Prison when it ultimately
tried him on the charges in this case, the trial was a continuation
of his initial transfer to Utah under the I.A.D.

In computing the

time period, the time Mr. Stilling was in Oregon should be tolled;
however, the more than 156 days which ran prior to his return to
Oregon must be added to the time computed after his return to Utah.
Mr. Stilling was available for trial throughout the
state's delay in bringing him to trial within the meaning of the
I.A.D. (R. 104). It is standard practice for prisoners to be
transported from Ogden to Salt Lake for trial (R. 229). Article
IV(a) says "In determining the duration and expiration of the time
periods provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the
running of said time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as
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A

The remedy for violation of the 120 day provision of the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers is dismissal with prejudice.3
Article v(c) of the I.A.D., Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5(V)(c)(1953 as
amended).
Based on the requirements of the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers, Mr. Stilling asks that the charges against him be
dismissed with prejudice as a result of the State's failure to bring
him to trial within 120 days.

To hold otherwise would allow a

receiving State to circumvent the I.A.D. where a defendant faces
more than one set of charges in that state.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
ARRAIGN MR. STILLING AND CONDUCT A PRELIMINARY
HEARING AFTER HE WAS RETURNED TO THE STATE OF UTAH.
On April 10f 1985, the trial judge ruled that Salt Lake
County could not "legally obtain custody of the defendant for trial
on the above charges by simply serving him with warrants while he
was in Utah temporarily pursuant to the Weber County request for
temporary custody" (R. 261). That same dayf the trial judge ordered
"that all proceedings in the above matters be dismissed" (R. 262).
When Mr. Stilling was returned to Utah in August 1985 to
serve his Weber County sentences. Salt Lake County obtained custody
of him from the Utah State prison and resumed its prosecution of
him, not from the beginning, but rather where it left off when the

3 "in the event that an action on the indictment, information or
complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not
brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or
Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where
the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall
enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer
based therein shall cease to be of any force or effect. U.C.A.
77-29-5(V)(c) .
- 14 -
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U t a h Cons* Li*iit . o n , n i t - , ,
Sec
.
Sec. 13. L Prosecution uy i.u formation ur indictment—Grand j.-!
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment,
shall be prosecuted by information after examination and commitment
by a magistrate/ unless the examination be waived by the accused
with the consent of the state, or by indictment, with or without
such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury
and the powers and duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the
Leg i s1a t u r e . (As amen de d N o vembe r 2, 194 8 , e ffeeti v e J a nua ry 1,
19 4 9 ) , (empha s i s a d de d )
5

Utah Code Ann. 77-35-7(c).
(d)(1) A preliminary examinatioi i sI Ia ] 1 be held in accordance with
the rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a
court. The state shall have the burden of proof and be required to
proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the state's case,
the defendant may testify under oath, call witnesses, and present
evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine the witnesses
against him. If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause
to believe that the crime charged has been committed and that the
defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall forthwith order, ii I
writing, that the defendant be bound over to answer in the district
court. The findings of probable cause may be based on hearsay in
whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was
acquired by unlawful means are not properly raised at the
preliminary examination. If the magistrate does not find probable
cause to believe that the crime charged has been committed or that
the defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the
information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may enter
findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order of dismissal. The
dismissal and discharge shall not preclude the state from,
instituting a subsequent pros<-^• 11": •-•>n f or f:he same of f ense .

that the complaint should contain the crime charged and the
jurisdictional facts. Pay at 305.
In this case, Mr. Stilling went through his initial
appearance, preliminary hearing and district court arraignment when
Salt Lake County had no jurisdiction over him.

The trial court did

not specifically address the contention, but found instead that it
had not dismissed Mr. Stilling's case, despite the order of April
10, and that Mr. Stilling had simply been returned to Oregon because
Salt Lake County did not have the authority to try him (R. 304).
In State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 646 (Utah 1986), this
Court stated "While the preliminary hearing is not a full-blown
determination of an accused's guilt or innocence, it is nonetheless
a "critical stage" in the criminal process, and proper consideration
for a defendant's constitutional rights must be observed."

In

Brickey, the court found that the state could not continually
subject a defendant to preliminary hearings without new evidence or
changed circumstances.

Id. at 647.

In the present case, the same logic requires that Mr.
Stilling be entitled to at least one legal pre-trial process. In
the event this Court agrees with the finding of the trial judge that
Salt Lake County had not legally obtained custody of Mr. Stilling,
and therefore the matter should not be dismissed under Article IV of
the I.A.D., the State should nevertheless be required to start at
the beginning of the process after Salt Lake County did legally
obtain custody, as required by Article I, Section 13 of the Utah
Constitution and U.C.A. 77-35-7(c)(1953 as amended).

As a result,

this Court should find that the trial court incorrectly refused to
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remand Mr. Stilling's case to circuit court for a legal bind-over,
and reverse the case and remand for a new trial, including initial
appearance and preliminary hearing in circuit court. The court
could not find both that custody was not legal and yet use the
initial appearance and preliminary hearing conducted during that
illegal custody.
POINT III. MR. STILLING'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY
TRIAL WAS VIOLATED.
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution guarantee an accused the right to a speedy trial.
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees that same
right and Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(1)(f) codifies the guarantee,
providing in pertinent part:
(1) In criminal prosecutions, the defendant is entitled:
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
county or district where the offense is alleged to have
been committed.
Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(1)(f )(1953 as amended).
This Court has recognized that the right to speedy trial "under the
Utah Constitution is no greater or less than its federal
counterpart."

State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1378 (Utah 1986).

In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the United
States Supreme Court adopted a balancing test in which the conduct
of the prosecution and the defense are weighed.

The court

articulated a four prong test for determining whether an accused has
been denied his federal constitutional right to a speedy trial. The
factors to be considered are:

(a) length of delay, (b) reason for

the delay, (c) defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial,
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and (d) prejudice to defendant as a result of the delay.

The Utah

Supreme Court adopted the Barker approach in State v. Hafen, 593
P.2d 538 (Utah 1979) .
The circumstances of the case are controlling in
determining whether a delay is excessive.
supra at 530-31.

See Barker v. Wingo,

The complexity of the charge is one factor to be

considered in determining whether a delay is excessive.

A longer

delay is permissible in bringing a complex conspiracy case to trial
than an ordinary street crime.

Barker v. Wingo, supra at 531.

In determining an acceptable length of delay under the
speedy trial statutes, other provisions of Utah law provide some
guidance.
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Utah Code Ann.
§77-29-5(v)(c), provides for a 120 day time limit from the time a
request for temporary custody is filed.

Utah's intrastate transfer

statute, Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(4) also places a 120 day time limit
on the state beginning from the time a prisoner requests disposition
of the relevant charges.
In the case before the court, Mr. Stilling did not have
his district court arraignment until 143 days after Salt Lake County
filed arrest warrants with Weber County.
This length of delay is longer than the time provided for
by the Utah legislature in the I.A.D. context, and meets the first
prong, unacceptable length of delay, of the Wingo test.
The testimony of the officer involved in prosecuting Mr.
Stilling's case indicates the reason for the delay was a "lapse" in
his attention to Mr. Stilling's case (R. 1720).
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This type of

failure on the part of the prosecution should favor Mr. Stilling and
fulfills the second prong of the Wingo test; an unacceptable reason
for the delay.
The facts indicate that Mr. Stilling began asserting his
right to a speedy trial soon after he appeared before a judge in
Salt Lake County (R. 47). Mr. Stilling testified that while he was
incarcerated in Weber County, he continually tried to discover what
was happening with the Salt Lake County charges (R. 1736-1737).

Mr.

Stilling contacted the Salt Lake Legal Defender office prior to
being appointed counsel in that office to speed disposition of the
Salt Lake County charges, and was told that the Salt Lake office
could not help him until he was arraigned on the charges (R. 1737).
As a result of these actions, Mr. Stilling asserted his right to a
speedy trial as required by Wingo.
Mr. Stilling's case also meets the last prong of the
Wingo test.
the delay.

That prong requires that a defendant be prejudiced by
A defendant who is incarcerated is prejudiced by such

incarceration while awaiting trial. One of the rationales behind
the interstate Agreement on Detainers is the prejudice that is
caused by both the defendant and the criminal justice system when an
accused is faced with a lack of finality and an inability to
participate in prison programs.

(See United States v. Mauro, supra

at 342.) After Mr. Stilling was returned to Utah, his participation
in prison rehabilitation programs was hampered by the still pending
Salt Lake County charges (R. 1256).

These facts indicate that Mr.

Stilling was prejudiced by the failure of Salt Lake County to grant
him a speedy trial.
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Mr. Stilling's speedy trial rights under the Utah and
United States Constitutions were violated by Salt Lake County's
failure to bring him to trial within a reasonable time after filing
arrest warrants with Weber County on September 19, 1984.
POINT IV. MR. STILLINGfS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
WAS VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE WEAKNESSES OF EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION.
Mr. Stilling was identified as the robber and convicted
based on the eyewitness identification of John Arthur Thomas, night
manager of Self's Foodland (R. 832-904).

Although Mr. Stilling

requested that a cautionary eyewitness identification instruction be
given to the juryf the trial court declined the request. Mr.
Stilling's case was tried five weeks prior to the court's decision
in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986).

While this Court has

taken the position that the decision in Long would be applied
prospectively, to not apply such decision to Mr. Stilling's case
violates his right to due process and equal protection of the laws
under Article I, Sections 2 and 7 of the Utah Constitution and the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S.
107 S.Ct.

, 93 L.Ed.2d 649,

(1987), the United States Supreme Court held that

the holding in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.

, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106

S.Ct. 1712 (1986) that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
to exclude blacks from a jury may violate equal protection should be
applied retroactively.

In Griffith v. Kentucky, supra, the Court

noted that:
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"failure to apply a newly declared
constitutional rule to criminal cases pending
on direct review violates basic norms of
constitutional adjudication"
Griffith v. Kentucky, 93 L.Ed.2d at 658.
The Griffith court acknowledged that "after we have decided a new
rule in a case selected, the integrity of the judicial review
requires that we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on
direct review . . . (and that) it is the nature of judicial review
that precludes us from 'simply fishing one case from the stream of
appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new
constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar
cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule1".
(citations omitted) (emphasis added) Id. at 658.
The Griffith Court also noted that "selective application
of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated
defendants the same" and that "the problem with not applying new
rules to cases pending on direct review is 'the actual inequity that
results when the court chooses which of many similarly situated
defendants should be the chance beneficiary' of a new rule"
(citations omitted).

Id. at 658-659.

The Griffith court went on to examine the "clear break"
exception whereby courts had applied prospectively rules of criminal
procedure deemed to be a "clear break" with precedent.

The Court

disapproved such a "clear break" exception and held "that a new rule
for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied
retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct
review . . . with no exception for cases in which the new rule
constitutes a "clear break" with the past".
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I<1. at 661.

In State v. Long, supra, the Utah Supreme Court
recognized that the failure to give a cautionary eyewitness
identification instruction could deny the defendant due process of
law under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

In the

present case, the failure to give such an instruction violated Mr.
Stilling's right to due process of law under the Utah Constitution
and failure to apply Long retroactively where such a constitutional
violation occurred violates Mr. Stilling's rights to due process and
equal protection of the law under the United States and Utah
Constitutions.

(See Griffith v. Kentucky, supra).

If the Long decision were applicable to this case, a
cautionary instruction on eyewitness identification would be
required.

In State v. Long, supra at 492, this Court stated:
"We therefore abandon our discretionary approach to
cautionary instructions and direct that in cases
tried from this date forward, trial courts shall
give such an instruction whenever eyewitness
identification is a central issue in a case and such
an instruction is requested by the defense."

The identification of Mr. Stilling was central to the case and the
defense requested an instruction regarding the weaknesses of
eyewitness identification.

Such an instruction was necessary under

the dictates of Long, and, had this case been tried six weeks later,
such an instruction would be mandated by Long.
In the event this Court maintains its decision to apply
Long prospectively, the applicable standard for reviewing a trial
court's failure to give an eyewitness identification instruction is
as follows:
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"Prior to Long, the law was that it lay within a
trial judge's discretion whether an eyewitness
identification instruction . . . was given,
[citations omitted] However, this court also stated
prior to Long that the failure to give an eyewitness
instruction might be an abuse of discretion where
there were serious questions about the reliability
of the eyewitness identification. [citations
omitted] (emphasis added).
State v. Quevedo, 54 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 (Utah 1987).
In State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1986), the Utah
Supreme Court held that a trial judge had abused his discretion in
failing to give a cautionary eyewitness identification instruction
based on a pre-Long standard.

In Jonas, serious questions as to the

reliability of the identification arose where (1) the victim had
little opportunity to observe his assailant, (2) the witness
initially described his assailant as clean-shaven, but later changed
his description to include a moustache; (3) the witness described an
assailant with a crooked nose yet selected a photo of the appellant,
who did not have a crooked nose; (4) the victim's trial testimony
showed that he was uncertain and hesitant in the way in which he
selected the defendant during the photo array; and (5) there were no
other witnesses or corroborating evidence.
In

Id.

Quevedo, the court found that the trial judge did not

abuse his discretion based on the pre-Long standard in refusing to
give a cautionary instruction.

In that case, four police officers,

trained to make such identifications, positively identified the
defendant at trial as the driver of a vehicle fleeing the scene of a
robbery.
years.

One of the officers had known the defendant for three

The officers located Quevedo in a nearby apartment, shortly

after the fleeing getaway car crashed.
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An occupant of the apartment

stated, "I don't know what he done, he just ran in here."

When

arrested, Quevedo wore the same jacket that the fleeing driver had
worn.
The facts of this case are synonymous with the facts of
Jonas and distinguishable from the facts of Quevedo.
Mr. Thomas identified Mr. Stilling first from a photo
array (R. 880-882).

At the preliminary hearing, Mr. Thomas

testified that he was about eighty-five percent certain the
photograph of Mr. Stilling he chose from the photo array was that of
the robber (State's Exhibit 9, Preliminary hearing, p. 6). In
court, three years after the robbery occurred, Mr. Thomas said he
was one-hundred percent sure Mr. Stilling was the robber (R. 857).
Of the two checkers on duty at the time of the robbery, Stacey
Roberts was completely unable to identify Mr. Stilling (R. 911) and
the other checker, Wendy Sheldon said she was seventy percent sure
Mr. Stilling was the robber (R. 951), despite the fact that she
never saw his face (R. 961-962) but also that it was "very possible"
that he was not (R. 965). When the male in the parking lot was
asked whether he could see the robber in the courtroom, he replied
no (R. 976).
Also, the witness's recollections of the robber vary,
with some witnesses saying the robber had light brown hair (R. 947,
R. 975) and others describing his hair as dark brown (R. 871). None
of the witnesses to the robbery saw the robber for more than five
minutes (R. 911, R. 860-862, R. 966, R. 978-980) and two of the four
witnesses admit to being under stress and afraid (R. 863, R. 959)
during their observation.

This level of observation is

- 24 -

significantly below that in Quevedo where the defendant
wasidentified by trained police officers, one of whom was personally
familiar with Quevedo.
In its recent opinion in State v. Branch, Opinion No.
20557 (September 17, 1987) this Court exhibited concern about
finding that a trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give
an eyewitness identification instruction where more than one witness
identified the defendant.

To draw a rigid rule based on the number

of witnesses who tentatively identified a defendant does not
directly address the question of whether in a given case the
identification evidence raised serious questions as to reliability.
In the present case, one of the witnesses who
"identified" Mr. Stilling did not have the opportunity to see his
face (R. 96); two others could not identify him in court (R. 911,
976) and another was only seventy percent certain of her
identification of Mr. Stilling as the person.

Hence, although more

than one witness existed, the testimony of such witnesses did not
remove the serious question as to reliability of the eyewitness
identification testimony.
In State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah 1980), this
court said "Defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his
theory of the crime if there is any basis in evidence to support
that theory".

In this case, the defense theory was a faulty

eyewitness identification.

This theory is supported by the

hesitancy with which the witnesses identified Mr. Stilling.
Corroborating evidence sufficient to overcome the serious
doubt as to the identification of Mr. Stilling as the robber did not
exist in this case. There was no additional evidence, physical or
- 25 -

otherwise, to place Mr. Stilling at the scene of the crime.

None of

the witnesses were trained observers familiar with the defendant as
were the police officers in Quevedo.

This case meets the

requirement of Quevedo that there be "serious questions about the
reliability of the eyewitness identification".

As a result, the

trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to give an eyewitness
identification instruction.
POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY SENTENCED
MR. STILLING BY IMPOSING SEPARATE SENTENCES FOR
THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND HABITUAL CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS.
On January 30, 1987, Mr. Stilling was sentenced by the
trial court to two concurrent sentences of five years to life; one
for his conviction for aggravated robbery and the second sentence
for his conviction under Utah's habitual criminal statute.
Utah's habitual criminal statute, U.C.A., 1953, Sec.
76-8-1001, 1002, provides for an enhanced sentence when a defendant
is convicted under the statute.

It states:

76-8-1001. Habitual Criminal-Determination.-Any
person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and
committed for felony offenses at least one of which
offenses having been at least a felony of the second
degree or a crime which, if committed within this
state would have been a capital felony, felony of
the first degree or felony of the second degree or a
crime which, if committed within this state would
have been a capital felony, felony of the first
degree or felony of the second degree, and was
committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at
least a felony of the second degree committed in
this state, other than murder in the first or second
degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and be
imprisoned in the state prison for from five years
to life.
Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1001 (1953 as amended).
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This statute operates within the confines of the United States and
Utah Constitutions, both of which contain double jeopardy
provisions.6
This Court recently noted that "increased penalties for
recidivists do not represent punishment for earlier crimes and
therefore do not violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy.
Rather, the fact of the earlier crimes aggravates the commission of
the latest crime, warranting the imposition of a longer sentence."
State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 287 (Utah 1985) quoting Note, The
Constitutionality of Statutes Permitting Increased Sentences for
Habitual or Dangerous Criminals, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 356, 361 N.29 (1975).
Mr. Stilling, however, was not given an enhanced or
longer sentence following his conviction under the habitual criminal
statute but rather was given a separate sentence of five to life to
run concurrently with his five to life sentence for the underlying
conviction of aggravated robbery.

As a result, Mr. Stilling's

double sentence fails to escape the double jeopardy challenge.
This double sentence is also inconsistent with the
enhancement purpose as delineated in State v. Bailey, supra, and
State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 1275, 1277 (1978).

In State v. Carter,

supra, this court found the Utah statute constitutional but the

b

The Fourth IV Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides: lf[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . ." United States
Constitution, Amendment V.
Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides in pertinent
part: " . . . nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense."
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sentence in that case was a true enhancement, not an additional
sentence as was imposed in Mr. Stilling's case.
In Lopez v. State, 700 P.2d 16 (Idaho 1985), the Idaho
Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had made an error of law in
imposing a separate sentence for a persistent violator conviction.7
The Idaho Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in State v.
Blevins, 697 P.2d 1253 (1985).

The court said "[t]he judgment

purports to impose two separate, albeit concurrent, life sentences one for the second degree murder and the other for the adjudication
of persistent violator status. Our persistent violator statute,
I.D. Sec. 19-2514, does not establish a separate offense nor does it
authorize a separate sentence."

Id. at 1258.

The Utah statute is analogous to the Idaho statute. Both
statutes impose the habitual criminal sentence following conviction
of the third designated felony, not following sentencing for that
felony.

In order to avoid a constitutional deficiency, this court

should read the Utah statute narrowly, as did the Idaho Court with
the Idaho statute, and find that it does not allow a judge to impose
a separate sentence for a habitual criminal conviction.
The Colorado Court of Appeals reached a similar
conclusion in People v. Early, 692 P.2d 1116 (Colo. App. 1984).

The

Court generalized about the purposes of habitual criminal statutes

7 Idaho Code Section 19-2514 provides: "Persistent violator Sentence on third conviction for felony. - Any person convicted for
the third time of the commission of a felony, whether the previous
convictions were had within the state of Idaho or were had outside
the state of Idaho, shall be considered a persistent violator of
law, and on such third conviction shall be sentenced to a term in
the custody of the state board of corrections which term shall be
for not less than five (5) years and said term may extend to life."
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saying, "(r)ather than imposing a separate sentence for defendant's
status, habitual criminal statutes merely substitute a different and
more severe sentencing range than the penalty provided for in the
criminal statute or statutes which were violated by defendant and
which constitute the underlying offense or offenses."
The trial court's decision to sentence Mr. Stilling twice
violates the principle behind habitual criminal statutes as well as
the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Utah
Constitutions.

Mr. Stilling's aggravated robbery conviction was not

enhanced by the habitual criminal sentence.

His second five to life

sentence can only be described as a second sentence for his three
previous felonies.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons and any and all reasons
set forth at oral argument, if any there be, Appellant respectfully
requests that this Court reverse his convictions and remand the case
for dismissal or, in the alternative for a new trial.
Alternatively, Appellant requests that this Court vacate his
sentence and remand the case to the Third District Court with an
order directing the District Court to correct its illegal sentence.
DATED this

-f;

day of October, 1987.

/JAfaES "C. BRADSHAW
( Artorney for Appellant

. ; M.--- ? '<>77
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
MAILED/DELIVERED eight copies of the foregoing to the
Utah Supreme Court, Salt Lake City, Utah and four copies to the
Attorney General's office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114 this

day of October, 1987.

I,

, hereby certify that I delivered

four copies of the foregoing to the Attorney General's Office
this

day of October, 1987.
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ADDENDUM A

FILED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

001 111985

Clfiik. Supreme Court, Utah

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Respondant,

PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO
APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY
ORDER

vs.
Case No.

STEVEN M. STILLINGS,

r

^ ^ ^

Defendant/Petitioner.

INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Stillings is charged in Third District Court,
Salt Lake Department with several aggravated robberies and other
crimes in cases numbered CR85-176, CR85-177, CR85-178, CR85-179
and CR85-180.
On August 17, 1984, Mr. Stillings, then an inmate at the
Oregon State Prison, was temporarily transferred to Utah to face
criminal charges in Weber County.

The transfer was effected pursuant

to Article IV of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, §77-29-5, Utah
Code Ann. (1982) (hereinafter cited as Agreement).

Prior to the

completion of proceedings in Weber County, Salt Lake County transferred
Mr. Stillings to its jurisdiction for prosecution on the charges in
the above cases.

Subsequently, Judge Dee ruled that the transfer

from Weber to Salt Lake Counties violated Article IV(a) of the Agreement and he suspended further proceedings against Mr. Stillings.
The judge ordered that officials return Mr. Stillings to Oregon.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order by Judge David B. Dee,
April 10, 1984, at 3 (hereinafter cited as Findings I ) .
Soon after his return to Oregon, Mr. Stillings was again

transferred to Utah to serve a committment at the Utah State Prison.
The above cases were revived and Mr. Stillings now contends he was not
tried by Salt Lake County during his initial presence in Utah within
the 120 day period also mandated by Article IV(c) of the Agreement.
He contends that failure entitles him to a dismissal of the present
cases.

Soon after his arrival back in Utah, Mr. Stillings moved

Judg'e Dee to dismiss these cases based on the above grounds, and
the Judge's denial of the motion is the basis of this petition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to and during August, 1984, Mr. Stillings was incarcerated in the Oregon State Prison, Salem, Oregon.

Weber County,

on June 14, 1984, and Salt Lake County, on July 23, 1984, filed
separate detainers (arrest warrants) on Mr. Stillings with Oregon
prison officials.

Under the Agreement, once a detainer has been filed,

either the inmate may demand disposition of the charges underlying
the detainer (Article III) or the receiving State may request
temporary custody of the inmate for trial on the charges (Article IV).
Or, the parties can take no action.

If the receiving state opts

to proceed under Article IV, the Agreement requires the inmate be
tried within 120 days of his arrival in the state.
On July 12, 1984, pursuant to Article IV(a) of the Agreement,
Weber County requested temporary custody of Mr. Stillings for prosecution.

Oregon officials made Mr. Stillings available to Utah

Officials on August 17, 1984, and on that day he was transported to
the Weber County Jail.

From August 17, 1984 until sometime in April,

1985, Mr. Stillings remained in Utah, housed either in the Weber or
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Salt Lake County Jails.

The Weber County proceedings lasted until

February 13, 1985, on which day Mr. Stillings entered guilty pleas
to reduced charges and was sentenced to three one to fifteen
indeterminate terms in the Utah State Prison.
On September 19, 1984, Salt Lake County initiated its
prosecution of Mr. Stillings by filing arrest warrants with Weber
County Jail officials.

It then transported Mr. Stillings to Salt

Lake County on January 14, January 29, and February 8, 1985, for his
initial appearance, preliminary hearing and arraignment, respectively,
on the above-named cases.

At each Salt Lake appearance, Mr. Stillings

moved to dismiss all Salt Lake County cases on the ground that the
120 day period within which he must be tried after arriving in Utah,
dictated in Article IV(c) of the Agreement, had run.

After each

appearance, he was immediately returned to the Weber County Jail.
When the Weber County cases ended on February 13, 1985, Mr. Stillings
was relocated in the Salt Lake County Jail.

Trial on the Salt Lake

County cases was set for March 4, 1985 before the Honorable David B.
Dee.
On February 21, 1985, Mr. Stillings moved the District Court
to dismiss the Salt Lake County charges on the grounds that the County
had not followed proper procedures outlined in the Agreement when it
went forward with its prosecution and obtained custody of him.

He

argued that under the Agreement he was entitled to have Oregon officials
review Salt Lake County's desire to prosecute him.

He also reiterated

his argument that the County had failed to bring him to trial within
the 120 day period mandated by the Agreement.
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In response to the Motion to Dismiss, Judge Dee, on April
10f 1985, ruled that Salt Lake County, by transferring Mr. Stillings
from Weber County to Salt Lake County without first filing a request
for temporary custody pursuant to Article IV(a) of the Agreement,
had violated Mr, Stillings right to a review of the transfer by
Oregon's governor as set out in Article IV(a).

In support of his

ruling, Judge Dee found th&t by filing a detainer on Mr. Stillings
while he was incarcerated in Oregon, Salt Lake County had triggered
application of the Agreement and was bound by its provisons.
at 2 .

Findings I

Those provisions require such a review.
To satisfy the requirements of the Agreement, Judge Dee ordered

that Petitioner be immediately returned to Oregon. Xcl. at 3 .

The

Judge reserved ruling on the 120 day issue when and if Mr. Stillings was
returned to Utah.

Oral Ruling at Hearing on Motion to Dismiss,

March 18, 1985.
Sometime before May 17, 1985, Mr. Stillings was paroled from
Oregon State Prison and returned to Utah to begin serving his committment to the Utah State Prison.

Upon motion of the State, trial on

the Salt Lake County cases was reset for September 3, 1985.
On June 12, 1985, Mr. Stillings renewed his motion to dismiss
based on the unargued aspect of his earlier motion that Salt Lake
County had violated Article IV(c) of the Agreement by not trying him
on its cases within 120 days of his arrival in Utah.

Mr. Stillings

contended that because he was available to Salt Lake County the entire
time he was in Utah, as evidenced by the County's success in transporting him to Salt Lake County for court appearances while the Weber
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County cases were pending, and because Salt Lake County in fact
proceeded with its prosecution against him, the 120 day period
should have commenced against Salt Lake County upon his arrival
in Utah.

He argued additionally that the Oregon officials, when

they were served with Salt Lake County's detainer, should have
informed Salt Lake County of Weber County's request for temporary
custody and authorized Weber County to release Mr. Stillings to
Salt Lake County officials. Mr. Stillings contended that under the
Agreement it was his right to have all the detainers filed against
him by a demanding state resolved while he was in that state.
Oregon's failure to facilitate that resolution denied Mr. Stillings
the protection accorded him by the Agreement and the only viable
mechanism to redress that denial is to hold that the time period
began running against Salt Lake County at the same time it began
against Weber County - August 17, 1984, the date he arrived in Utah.
To ensure that both the spirit and the letter of the Agreement is
carried out courts have held that the receiving state must bear the
consequences of the improper actions of the sending state.

State

v. Lincoln, 601 p.2d 641 (Colo. 1978) .
Additionally, Mr. Stillings contended that the present case
closely paralled the facts in United States v. Ford, 436 U.S. 340,
56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978) , and that the Ford decision mandated dismissal
of the Salt Lake County charges.

Once the Agreement is triggered,

which occurred when Salt Lake County filed its detainer in Oregon,
then the 120 day period commences when the receiving State initiates
disposition of its charges.

436 U.S. at 364.
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Salt Lake County

initiated disposition of its charges on September 19, 1984, by serving
its arrest warrants on Petitioner in the Weber County Jail.

It

then continued in January, 1985, what it had started on September
19, 1984, by bringing Mr. Stillings down to Salt Lake County for
various court appearances.

Salt Lake County thus took advantage of

the beneficial aspects of the Agreement by attempting to try Mr.
Stillings while he was in Utah, but is arguing that it should not be
made to live up to its responsibilities under the Agreement to try
him within 120 days.

This is precisely the situation that the Ford

case addressed and found to be an unacceptable violation of the
Agreement.

Id.

Thus, if the 120 day period did not begin to run

against Salt Lake County upon Mr. Stillings arrival in Utah on August
17, 1984, then it must have begun on September 19, 1984, when Salt
Lake County began its prosecution of Mr. Stillings by arresting him.
After hearing argument, Judge Dee denied Mr. Stillings motion
to dismiss.

Mr. Stillings contends that that ruling unfairly permitted

Salt Lake County to make use of the Agreement at the expense of his
rights contained therein.
QUESTIONS OF LAW
Mr. Stillings does not contest the propriety of Judge Dee's
conclusions of law contained in Findings I.

He will assume for

purposes of this section, that those conclusions are correct.

Based

on that assumption, there are only two questions of law presented to
this court:
Under the facts of this case is the State of Utah, by and
through Salt Lake County, bound by the 120 day time period contained
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in Article IV(c) of the Agreement, and, if so, had that time period
run by the March 4, 1984 trial setting?
If the 120 day time is applicable, and had run by the March
4, 1984 trial setting, should the present cases be dismissed with
prejudice?
WHY IMMEDIATE APPEAL SHOULD BE PERMITTED
The above issues can and should be decided prior to rather
than after trial on the present charges.

They can be decided prior

to trial because they require no findings of fact or conclusions of
law which would have to be elicited at trial.

The issues in this

Petition are completely independant of any issues that would be
raised at trial. They should be decided prior to trial so as to avoid
lengthy and expensive trials on the substantive charges.
Lake County charges involve five separate informations.

The Salt
Each infor-

mation contains allegations of armed robbery, theft, possession of
a firearm by a restricted person and being a habitual criminal.

Mr.

Stillings will move the trial court to sever the firearm count from
the others and anticipates that said motion will be granted.
v. Saunders, No. 19054 (Filed April 3, 1985).

State

Because the code

requires a separate trial also on the habitual criminal charge, it
will take fifteen (15) jury trials to fully and fairly adjudicate
the charges in the five informations.

To present an adequate defense,

Mr. Stillings also anticipates moving the trial court for costs to
bring in out-of-state witnesses.

Fifteen jury trials with attendant

costs is an obvious burden on the State of Utah and on the defense,
particularly on the out-of-state witnesses.
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It is also a great

psychological burden on Mr. Stillings.

If there is any hope that

this Court would reverse Judge Dee's ruling and order the charges
dismissed, then this should occur prior to the trials rather than
after.
APPEAL WILL MATERIALLY ADVANCE TERMINATION OF
LITIGATION
If this Court reverses the District Court's ruling the
Agreement mandates that the charges be dismissed.

That result would

obviously do more than merely materially advance termination of the
litigation.

If this Court upholds Judge Dee's ruling and these cases

are reset for trial, the defense will be forced to rethink its plea
bargaining position due to the fact that these issues constitute
the main feature of Mr. Stillings' defense. The defense would be much
more inclined to accept a reasonable offer and that result is indeed
a material step toward terminating the cases.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner requests this Court to review Judge Dee's denial of
his Motion to Dismiss the charges in the present cases on the ground
he was not brought to trial within the 120 day period mandated by the
Agreement.

Said request is based on the reasoning contained in United

States v. Ford, supra, which dictates that Salt Lake County is bound
by the time period and that said period had run well before a trial
date was set.

The issue was timely raised below and would materially

advance the termination of litigation by either terminating the cases
by an order of dismissal or cause the petitioner to seriously reevaluate his plea bargaining position.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

• ' / *

day of October, 1985

itU^fr
THOMAS J. McgO
Attorney f9r Petitioner
Salt Lake" Legal Defender Assn,
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing Petition for
Permission to Appeal from an Interloctutory Order to the Salt
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111, and the Attorney General's Office, 236 State
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
of October, 1985.

^^'1^
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ADDENDUM B

77-29-5, Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment into law
— Text of agreement. The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby
enacted into law and entered into by this state with all other jurisdictions
legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows:
The contracting states solemnly agree that
ARTICLE I
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner,
detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and
difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other
jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner
treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party
states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and
orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status
of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or
complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to
such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction,
cannot properly be had in the absence of co-operative procedures. It is the
further purpose of this agreement to provide such co-operative procedures.
ARTICLE II
As used in this agreement
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States
of America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of
Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time that he initiates a request for final dispositions pursuant
to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof.
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had
on an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article IV hereof.
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ARTICLE III
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a
penal or correctional institution of a party state, anH^henevVr"durmgfthe
continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other
party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis
of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be
brought to trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered
to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting
officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and
his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good cause shown in open court, the
prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the
matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request
of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate
official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment
under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time
remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned,
the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state
parole agency relating to the prisoner.
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in
paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden,
commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who
shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate
prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested.
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having
custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his
right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information
or complaint on which the detainer is. based
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to
paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all
untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose
prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed.
The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody
of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers
and courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the
prisoner's request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being
initiated by the prisoner Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph
shall be accompanied by copies of the prisoner's written notice, request,
and the certificate. If trial is not had on any indictment, information or
complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the
original place of imprisonment, such indictment, information or complaint
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shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an
order dismissing the same with prejudice.
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to
a paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition
with respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included
therein by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to
the receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after
completion of his term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request
for final disposition shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the
production of his body in any court where his presence may be required
in order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a further consent
voluntarily to be returned to the original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this paragraph
shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law.
(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of
the request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall
void the request
ARTICLE IV
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried
indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have
a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a
term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance
with Article V (a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in
which the prisoner is incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, information or complaint shall have duly
approved, recorded and transmitted the request; and provided further that
there shall be a period of 30 days after receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within which period the governor of
the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary custody or
availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner.
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already
served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of
good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any
decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and appropriate courts
in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with
similar certificates and with notices informing them of the request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor.
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(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall
be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the
prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the
matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any
prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his delivery as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be
opposed or denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery.
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original
place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V (e) hereof, such indictment,
information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and
the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
ARTICLE V
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof,
the appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state
where such indictment, information or complaint is pending against such
person in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the
request for final disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary
custody shall accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of
this agreement In the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority
in the receiving state shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided
by this agreement, or to the prisoner's presence in federal custody at the
place for trial, whichever custodial arrangement may be approved by the
custodian.
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of
temporary custody shall present the following upon demand:
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the
state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given.
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint
on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of
which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made.
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary
custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment,
information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been
lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or
Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the
indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an
order dismissing the same with-prejudice, and any detainer based thereon
shall cease to be of any force or effect.
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(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only
for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or more untried indictments, informations or complaints
which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on
any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction. Except
for his attendance at court and while being transported to or from any
place at which his presence may be required, the prisoner shall be held
in a suitable jail or other facility regularly used for persons awaiting prosecution.
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this
agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state.
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner
is otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement,
time being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall
be earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow.
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as
provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to
remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state
and any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same
manner as an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any
other manner permitted by law.
(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory
and custody of the sending state, the state in which the one or more
untried indictments, informations or complaints are pending or in which
trial is being had shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay
all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping and returning the prisoner.
The provisions of this paragraph shall govern unless the states concerned
shall have entered into a supplementary agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as between or among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to alter or affect any
internal relationship among the departments, agencies and officers of and
in the government of a party state, or between a party state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor.
ARTICLE VI
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said
time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is
unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of
the matter.
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by
this agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally
ilL
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ARTICLE VH
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting
jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this
agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information necessary to the effective operation of this agreement
ARTICLE VIE
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state
when such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agreement may withdraw herefrom enacting a statute repealing the same. However, the withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any
proceedings already initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time
such withdrawal takes effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect
thereof.
ARTICLE IX
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any
phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be
contrary to the Constitution of any party state or of the United States or
the applicability thereof to any government; agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this agreement and
the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby* If this agreement shall be held contrary to the Constitution of any state party hereto, the agreement shall
remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force
and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

ADDENDUM C

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

ANSWER IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR PERMISSION
TO APPEAL FROM AN
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER

vs.
STEVEN M. STILLINGS,

Case No. 20480

Defendant-Petitioner.
COMES NOW the State of Utah, plaintiff-respondent
in the above-entitled matter, by and through counsel, Earl
F. Dorius, Assistant Attorney General, and hereby files
this Answer in Opposition to Defendant-Petitioner's Petition
for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order pursuant
to Rule 5(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE HAS BEEN NO VIOLATION OF THE
INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-5 (1953)
AS AMENDED, THAT WOULD WARRANT
DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGES PRESENTLY
PENDING AGAINST DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.
Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant-petitioner's
Statement of Facts in his Petition is correct, there has been
no violation by the prosecution of the Interstate Agreement
of Detainers (IAD), Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (1953), as
amended, to justify dismissal of the charges presently
pending against him.

He asserts he was incarcerated in an Oregon
penitentiary when the Weber County Attorney requested
temporary custody of him under Article IV of the IAD
(Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5) to try him on certain charges they
had pending against him.

He was transferred to Weber County

where he subsequently pled guilty to the charges and was
sentenced to the Utah State Prison on or about February 13,
1985.

He claims no irregularity with these proceedings under

the IAD.
However, while he was incarcerated in the Weber
County Jail, as a pre-trial detainee on the Weber County
charges, the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office commenced
criminal proceedings which they had pending against him.
On February 21, 1985, petitioner moved to dismiss those
charges, relying on two theories which are wholly inconsistent with each other:

(1) that Salt Lake officials had not

properly presented an Article IV, IAD request for temporary
custody to Oregon officials to secure custody to try him,
and (2) the 120-day period provided for in Article IV of
the IAD in which the prosecutors must bring him to trial had
run.

The latter argument would clearly be frivolous if the

former argument prevailed for if there had not been on Article IV
request for temporary custody, the 120-day period under
Article IV would never have commenced.

Judge David B. Dee

agreed with petitioner's first theory, granted his motion to
dismiss, and ordered his return to Oregon to allow Oregon
-2-

officials the opportunity to first review any request for
temporary custody which might then be made by Salt Lake
officials.

This ruling clearly comports with the pro-

visions of Article IV of the IAD.
Thereafter, no request for temporary custody was
ever made by Salt Lake officials because petitioner was soon
paroled by Oregon authorities and he was returned to Utah to
commence serving his prison
convictions.

sentences on the Weber County

(Nor did petitioner at any time ever attempt to

pursue any remedies available to him under Article III of the
IAD to dispose of the Salt Lake charges).
Once petitioner was incarcerated in the Utah State
Prison the terms of the IAD no longer applied, and any remedy
for prompt disposition of any other Utah charges pending
against him would lie under Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1953)
as amended.

Petitioner did not avail himself of this provision.

Salt Lake County officials soon renewed their prosecution.

Petitioner also renewed his Motion to Dismiss claiming

the 120-day period under Article IV (c) of the IAD had run.
His Motion was denied by the trial court, and it is this
ruling he seeks to appeal.
Petitioner contends that because he was "available"
to Salt Lake County during the time he was in Utah being held
on the Weber County charges, the Article IV (c) 120-day period
should be deemed to have commenced upon his arrival in Utah.
This position goes far beyond the terms of the IAD.

One re-

ceiving State prosecutor's decision to prosecute charges
-3-

and obtain temporary custody of a defendant under Article IV
of the IAD is in no way binding on other prosecutors in the
receiving State•

Although Article IV (b) requires that

correctional officers in the sending State notify other
prosecutors in a receiving State (who have also lodged
detainers against an inmate) that a fellow prosecutor in
their state has requested temporary custody and that the
prisoner is being made available to that prosecutor, there
is no mandate that the other prosecutors also bring that
inmate to trial during that period.

The provision is infor-

mational only in the event the other prosecutors might choose
to file their own Article IV request for temporary custody,
and that was not done in this case.

The provision in Article

IV (b) does not create a right of disposition of charges for
a prisoner.

Article IV is the prosecutor's half of the IAD.

Any right the petitioner might have to have the charges
disposed of lies within Article III of the IAD, and nothing
would have precluded petitioner from filing an Article III
request for disposition of the Salt Lake charges during that
period.

He did not do so and instead chose to do the opposite

by moving to dismiss the Salt Lake charges on the ground that
no proper Article IV request had been made by the Salt Lake
prosecutor.

He is thus not in a position to claim a denial

of any right he may have had to have the Salt Lake charges
brought to trial. Whether Oregon officials did or did not
-4-

notify other Utah officials of Petitioner's availability for
prosecution under Article IV (b) accordingly should not serve
as a basis for dismissal of the Salt Lake charges.
Petitioner's latest claim that the 120 days should
be deemed to have run because "he was available to Salt Lake
County the entire time he was in Utah" also flies in the face
of his earlier argument that he was not available for prosecution and should have been returned to Oregon because an
Article IV request had not been made by Salt Lake authorities.
He prevailed on this claim and should be bound by that argument.

He should be precluded from having it both ways.
Finally, petitioner claims United States v. Mauro,

436 U.S. 340 (1978)1, mandates dismissal of the Salt Lake
charges.

He claims that once the application of the IAD

is triggered (when Salt Lake County filed its detainer with
Oregon Correctional authorities), then the 120-day period
commences when the "receiving State" initiates disposition
of its charges.

He overreads both the IAD and Mauro.

The Mauro. court (in Mr. Ford's case) merely held
that the United States is a party to the IAD, and that when
the federal government demands that a State correctional
official make a State- prisoner available for prosecution and
obtains custody by way of a writ of habeas corpus ^d prosequendum,
1 Petitioner miscites the case as "United States v. Ford"
in his petition. Mr. Ford's case was joined with Mr. Maurofs
on appeal.
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it has effectually activated Article IV of the IAD and it must
bring the prisoner to trial within 120 days as required by
Article IV (c). The writ was viewed as tantamount to a "written
request for temporary custody" within the meaning of Article
IV (a). Mr. Ford, unlike petitioner, had also made repeated
requests for a speedy trial.

In petitioner's case, no

semblance of any request for temporary custody was ever made
by Salt Lake officials on Oregon officials.

Thus, Article IV

was never triggered at all.
Based upon the foregoing, petitioner's Petition for
interlocutory appellate review should be denied.
DATED this

21st day of October, 1985.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact
copies of the foregoing Answer in Opposition to Petition for
Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order, postage
prepaid, to Thomas J. McCormick, attorney for petitioner,
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 333 South Second East,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this jSsiA

day of October, 1985.

